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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF JUSTICE’S POST-FRANCOVICH JURISPRUDENCE
Vladimir PavloviÊ*
Summary: This article argues that the Francovich line of cases has 
revealed certain pro-integration leanings of the European Court of Jus-
tice. Following the Francovich judgment - considered reasonable by 
the vast majority of commentators - the Court has over time gone on 
to develop an expansive and sweeping doctrine of state liability to 
individuals with respect to the state’s failure to implement directives 
- all this without much, if any, support in Community legislation. In 
developing this doctrine, the Court has overstepped its role as the in-
terpreter of Community law and obscured the demarcation of powers 
and competencies between Member States and the European Union. 
The concrete implications of this development range from undermining 
the functionality and institutional structure of the European Union, to 
imposing high and unnecessary costs on Member States.
I. Introduction
This article has arisen out of a suspicion that the European Court 
of Justice has engaged, in its post-Francovich line of cases, in an unwar-
ranted pro-European-integration agenda through an expansion of the 
principle that states are liable to individuals for damages suffered as a 
consequence of the state’s non implementation of Community law. The 
suspicion has been confi rmed in many areas, though not in all. The main 
thesis of the article is that the Court’s pro-integration leaning is costly for 
the European Union because it erodes the Union’s constitutional struc-
ture by creating a historical lacuna in its democratic legitimacy, and be-
cause it hampers its immediate wellbeing by imposing signifi cant costs 
on Member States. This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a 
historical background of the Court’s decisions relevant to the thesis. Part 
III analyses the issue of the Court’s relative compliance with the com-
monality principle of Article 288 of the Treaty. Part IV discusses certain 
concrete costs imposed on Member States by the Court’s approach and 
the Community legislature’s vague language. Part V discusses the seri-
*  Associate, Allen & Overy LLP, New York. JD University of Michigan Law School (2007). I 
am most grateful to Professor Walter van Gerven for encouraging me to embark me on this 
project.
180 Vladimir PavloviÊ: Some Observations on the European Court...
ousness of the breach requirement of the state liability doctrine. Part VI 
offers some additional general thoughts. Part VII concludes. 
II. Background
The European Union has long struggled with the problem of compli-
ance of Member States with its legislation. This has been true in particu-
lar for EU directives. Unlike EU regulations - legislation that is ‘binding 
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’ - directives 
are legislation that Member governments are required to transpose into 
national law, binding as to the results to be achieved but leaving Member 
States a choice of methods to reach these goals.1  The Court of Justice 
has long had jurisdiction, under Articles 169 and 170 of the Rome Treaty, 
over cases of non-compliance of Member State governments with the EU 
legislation but, before 1992 and the ratifi cation of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the EU treaties contained no provisions that allowed for the imposition 
of penalties on Member State governments for failure to implement EU 
directives.2 Needless to say, there have been many examples of govern-
ments abusing this circumstance.  
Naturally, the Court has sought to enhance the compliance of Mem-
ber States with EU directives.3 The fi rst step in this direction was the 
Court’s developing of the doctrine of ‘direct effect’, under which certain 
EU provisions have been interpreted as granting rights to individuals, 
in addition to imposing duties on governments.4 Under the ‘direct effect’ 
doctrine, individuals could enforce a right so granted against Member 
States in Member State court proceedings5 if the relevant right-granting 
provision was clear and unambiguous, unconditional, and not dependent 
on further action taken by the EU or national authorities.6 At the outset, 
the Court shrewdly realised that ‘the vigilance of individuals concerned 
to protect their rights’ can lift some burden from the Commission in se-
curing compliance with the EU Treaty.7 Indeed, the doctrine of ‘direct 
effect’, together with the doctrine of supremacy of EC law over national 
1  EC Treaty art 249.
2  In Maastricht, art 171was amended to allow for the imposition of penalties on govern-
ments that failed to comply with the Court’s judgments. See G Garrett et al, ‘The European 
Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’ 
(1998) 52(1) International Organization 168 n 54.
3  Ibid
4  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlande Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
5  JE Pfander, ‘Member State Liability and Constitutional Change in the United States and 
Europe’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 237.
6   Garrett (n 2) 169.
7  Van Gend en Loos (n 4).
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laws,8 provided a powerful enhancement to the enforcement of European 
law.9 But the Court did not stop there. Extending its original direct effect 
principle (in a quite straightforward manner), the Court held that ‘direct 
effect’ applied to regulations.10 Shortly afterwards, the Court decided that 
the doctrine also applied to directives,11 qualifying this principle in a later 
holding by ruling that ‘direct effect’ applies to a directive only when the 
deadline for its implementation has passed.12 Next, the Court ruled that 
private parties could not sue other private parties, but only the state, 
for breaching directives that have not been implemented in the national 
law,13 thereby endorsing the notion of vertical direct effect but rejecting 
the doctrine of horizontal direct effect.14 Temporarily pushing aside the 
‘direct effect’ doctrine, the Court next held that, even if a directive has 
not been transposed into national law by the legislature, Member State 
courts must interpret existing national law in light of that directive, and 
that any ambiguous domestic legal rules must be interpreted, to the ex-
tent possible, in such a way as to achieve the results specifi ed in the 
directive.15 Finally, after the passage of the Single European Act in 1986 
and the wave of directives that followed, the Commission intensifi ed its 
efforts to sanction Member governments for the non-implementation or 
inadequate implementation of directives. However, the use of Articles 169 
to 171 of the Rome Treaty was largely toothless due to the lack of enforce-
ment provisions. Accordingly, governments would simply refuse to imple-
ment judgments and faced no consequences.16 Such was the case with 
Italy, which failed to implement a directive requiring it to set up a system 
ensuring that employees were paid salaries owed to them in the event 
that their employer went bankrupt. Even after the Commission brought 
a successful action against Italy under Article 169, the state audaciously 
refused to take action to transpose the directive.17 It was against this 
background that the Francovich18 ruling came about, marking the begin-
ning of the second stage, much more potent than the previous one, of the 
Court-led enforcement of Community law.   
8  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL 1964 ECR 585.
9  Pfander (n 5) 251-52.
10  Case 34/73 Variola Spa v Amminstrazione Italiana delle Finanza [1973] ECR 981. 
11  Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Offi ce [1974] ECR 1337.
12  Case 148/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 1629.
13  Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching) [1986] ECR 723.
14  Pfander (n 5) 252.  
15  See Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Inter De Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-
4135; see also Pfander (n 5) 252; Garrett (n 2) 169.
16  Garrett (n 2) 169.  Note that the Maastricht Treaty had not been ratifi ed at this time.  
17  Case 22/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR-143.
18  Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9-90 Francovich v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
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In Francovich, two Italian workers sued the state for compensation 
of losses that they suffered as a result of Italy’s failure to implement the 
directive. Ruling in favour of the workers, the Court held that liability 
was inherent in the system of the Treaty, and that it followed from the 
obligations of Member States under Article 5 of the Treaty to ‘nullify the 
unlawful consequences of a breach of Community law.’19 The liability ap-
plies, according to the Court, even in the absence of comparable liability 
in national legal systems, provided that three conditions are satisfi ed. 
First, the directive must grant rights to individuals; second, the content 
of these rights must be identifi able; and third, there must be causation 
between the breach of the State’s obligation and the damage suffered.20 
The ruling in Francovich, however, also left much unresolved, particu-
larly regarding the scope of liability.  In several subsequent rulings, the 
Court refi ned the defi nition of Member State liability, recently in quite 
sweeping terms.21  
In Brasserie/Factortame,22 the Court extended the Francovich princi-
ple, fi nding that it was applicable to breaches of Community law commit-
ted by Member State legislature,23 but also limited it by requiring that the 
breach be ‘suffi ciently serious.’24 In addition, since Brasserie/Factortame 
involved alleged breaches of directly effective Community provisions en-
forceable in national courts (not an unimplemented directive, as in Fran-
covich), the Court had to decide whether state liability applies in light 
of the existence and availability of alternative remedies. Although the 
Member States made an obvious argument that the availability of these 
alternative remedies made it unnecessary for the Court to declare an 
individual right to compensation from the state, the Court held that the 
right applies irrespective of alternative remedies.25 Crucially, the Court 
also hinted that state liability should lie in the case of violation of Com-
munity law by any branch of state government.26  
The Court further refi ned Francovich, this time regarding directives, 
very shortly after Brasserie/Factortame, when it ruled in British Telecom-
munications that the conditions for imposing state liability set out in 
19  Ibid paras 35-36.
20  Ibid para 40.
21  Pfander (n 5) 254.
22  Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany [1996] ECR I-
1029 and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd [1996] ECR I-1029. 
23  Both in cases of legislative omission in the case of Brasserie and legislative act in the 
case of Factortame. See W Van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Unbridgeable: Community and Na-
tional Tort Law after Francovich and Brasserie’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 507, 517.
24  Brasserie/Factortame (n 22) para 51.
25  Ibid paras 18-20.
26  Ibid paras 32, 34.
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Brasserie/Factortame apply to cases of the incorrect implementation of 
directives into national law.27 Similarly, in Dillenkofer, the Court ruled 
that a failure to take any measure to transpose a directive before the im-
plementation deadline constituted per se a suffi ciently serious violation 
of Community law and consequently gave rise to Francovich liability.28  
Faithful to its allusion in Brasserie/Factortame that a state can be 
liable for breach by any branch of government, the Court decided the 
Köbler case, establishing a principle that a Member State may be liable 
for damages for an infringement of Community law by its court of last in-
stance.29 The Court also held that the serious breach requirement would 
be fulfi lled where ‘the decision [of a national court] concerned was made 
in a manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter.’30 A re-
fi nement of these principles came in Traghetti where the Court affi rmed 
Köbler, holding that Member States are liable for damages caused to an 
individual by a manifest infringement of Community law attributable to 
a supreme court.31 Traghetti’s main innovation in this respect was the 
removal of the potential limitation of state liability - which could exist in 
national law - to cases of intentional fault and serious misconduct on the 
part of the court.  Instead, if the Court thinks that a national court com-
mitted a manifest infringement of Community law (which may result from 
an interpretation of the provisions of law or an assessment of facts and 
evidence32), liability attaches to mistakes of national courts as well. 
Viewed over time, this case law makes it apparent that the Court 
has gradually moved away from its original purpose - achieved through 
an intent-based Francovich doctrine - of preventing the abuse by Mem-
ber States of a weak and unenforceable system of compliance with EU 
legislation. What has instead been established is a dramatically different, 
result-oriented, strict liability doctrine, one upshot of which is that, pres-
ently, a Member State’s highest court’s misinterpretation (as determined 
subsequently by the Court of Justice) of any provision of Community Law 
can render the state liable for damages for that misinterpretation.   
III. Commonality in Member States
Article 288 spells out the commonality requirement, stating that ‘the 
Community shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the 
27  Case C-178/94 British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-0000.
28  Case C-178/94 Dillenkofer v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-4845.
29  Case C-224/01 Köbler v Republic Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239.
30  Ibid para 56.
31  Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA (in liquidation) v Italy [2006] All ER (EC) 
983 para 46.
32  Ibid. 
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laws of the Member States, make good any damage...’33 Of course, nobody 
would seriously maintain that a common principle is one that necessarily 
exists in all Member States. To satisfy this requirement of commonality, it 
is enough that the principle be accepted by the majority in a suffi ciently 
large number of Member States in which the issue has arisen in similar 
circumstances.34 The principle need not even be expressed as a concrete 
rule and may refl ect a guideline or a maxim, so long as it results in simi-
lar solutions in similar situations.35  
While it is quite uncontroversial that the commonality requirement 
has been satisfi ed in Francovich, doubts have been raised as to whether 
it has been met in Brasserie/Factortame and Köbler,36 and it is even more 
doubtful that it has been met in Traghetti. Specifi cally, the principle that 
Francovich liability applies when a violation of Community law is attrib-
utable to a Member State legislator has no support whatsoever in the 
laws of the Member States.37 Probably recognising this, the Court of Jus-
tice in Brasserie/Factortame offered in support of its position a rule of 
international law that a state must be viewed as a single entity regardless 
of which branch of government is responsible for the breach.38 While this 
principle, in the abstract, gives some support to the Court’s decision, it is 
not clear how it fulfi ls the commonality requirement.  
Similarly, in Köbler, the Court ruled, deferring to the opinion of Ad-
vocate General Leger, that liability for court decisions is accepted in near-
ly all the national legal systems of the Member States.39 The reasoning of 
the Advocate General, however, merits at least two observations.  
First, the Advocate General partially bases his claim, that the com-
monality requirement  is satisfi ed, upon the recognition by the EU mem-
bers within the Council of Europe of state liability for violations of human 
rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).40 This 
comparison is unconvincing, for at least two reasons. First, the cases un-
der ECHR concern very important, fundamental rights, while in the case 
of Köbler liability, the courts might be dealing with something as trivial 
33  EC Treaty art 288 (2) (emphasis added).
34  W Van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’ in F 




37  Ibid (citing Van Gerven et al (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational, 
and International Tort Law (2nd edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000)).
38  Brasserie/Factortame (n 22) paras 32, 34.
39  Köbler (n 29) para 48; see also Classen’s comment on Köbler (2004) 41 CMLR 813, 815. 
40  Köbler v Austria, Opinion of Advocate General Leger, 8 April 2003 paras 79-80.
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as a Community directive on the luminosity of bicycle taillights.41 Sec-
ond, in the ECHR, Member States have expressly submitted themselves 
to the jurisdiction of a special international Court and to the possibility 
of individual complaints and the potentially ensuing state liability for in-
dividual damages resulting from the mistakes of their high courts.42 This 
point is of particular importance in this article because it elucidates the 
fact that, unlike the European Court of Human Rights that adjudicates 
cases under the ECHR and is endowed with full democratic legitimacy by 
the assent of Members of the Council of Europe, the Court of Justice, at 
least in the case of Köbler liability, lacks such legitimacy.
The second point worth illuminating in the Leger opinion is that the 
Advocate General himself reveals inconsistency in the application of the 
legal principle of state liability in many Member States.  Namely, he as-
serts from the outset that the principle of state liability for judicial acts 
is common across all Member States, only to proceed to list no less than 
eight exceptions for Member States that do not accept the principle in 
some form. While it is possible that he is correct in his conclusion that ‘in 
spite of the divergences which exist today, the principle of State liability 
- for a judgment of a supreme court in breach of a legal rule - is generally 
acknowledged by the Member States, or at least a strong tendency in that 
direction can be detected,’ it is at least contestable, since the Advocate 
General never defi nes the criteria used to decide what makes a principle 
common. Furthermore, after reading the data laid out in support of the 
purported common agreement across different Member States43 of hold-
ing a state liable for the acts of its courts, it seems that a conclusion that 
the principle is not common enough to satisfy the requirement of Article 
288 would be just as valid.44
IV. Consequences of the ambiguity of language of the Court of Justice 
and Community legislation
Much of Community legislation, as well as many decisions of the 
Court of Justice, suffers from less-than-clear language.45 A survey of the 
Court of Justice’s case law would reveal the Court’s reluctance to revise 
overtly its earlier judgments, amplifying the lack of clarity. For example, 
in Dillenkofer, the Court holds that ‘failure [of states] to take any measure 
41  PJ Wattel, ‘Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On Meeting Like This’ (2004) 41 
CMLR 177, 187.
42  Ibid.
43  Leger Opinion (n 40) paras 77-82.
44  J Komarek, ‘Inter-Court Constitutional Dialogue after the Enlargement - Implications of 
the Case of Professor Köbler’ (2005) 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 75.
45  Wattel (n 41) 178-79, citing Regulation 1408/71 on the social security of migrant work-
ers as an example of unintelligible legislation.    
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to transpose a directive in order to achieve the result it prescribes within 
the period laid down for that purpose constitutes per se a serious breach 
of Community law’, and gives rise to Francovich liability.46 Plain reading 
of this language implies that a Member State might avoid the imposition 
of Francovich liability if it takes at least some measures directed towards 
transposing the directive on time. The phrase has, however, been inter-
preted much more broadly. Namely, commentators have asserted that a 
‘[f]ailure to implement a directive on time, or at all, is per se a suffi cient-
ly serious breach to give rise to the Francovich liability.’47  The obvious 
discrepancy in the possible readings of the provision could put Member 
States in quite a predicament when deciding how to go about implement-
ing a directive. As mentioned before, a Member State for which it is com-
plicated or expensive to implement a directive in a timely manner might 
plausibly read the Court’s language as allowing it to take some measures 
towards the implementation and so avoid liability for damages, even if the 
full implementation may exceed the deadline. The language ambiguity, of 
course, should not be permitted to serve as an excuse for states to avoid 
implementing a directive, but it is clear that in the process of the making 
of a decision on how to go about such an often very costly enterprise it 
might, among other reasons, cause a delay.  
Another example of the insuffi cient clarity in the Court’s case law 
has to do with the question of causation. In Brasserie/Factortame, the 
Court alluded to the possibility that an individual contribution to the oc-
currence of damage might break the chain of causation.48 This approach 
to causation is not refl ected in the laws of all Member States; specifi cally, 
in English law it is a matter of the measure of compensation, not causa-
tion.49 In light of the already existing different approaches to the issue, po-
tentially varied interpretations of this language by national courts could 
have a signifi cant effect on the Francovich remedy in national courts.50  
These examples, showing that ambiguously worded legislation will 
probably be differently interpreted in different Member States, are a good 
introduction to a discussion on the important circumstances that the 
Court must carefully consider whenever it writes its opinions, namely, 
the three markedly different legal cultures in Europe.51  
46  Dillenkofer (n 28) para 29 (emphasis added).
47  TK Hervey, ‘Francovich Liability Simplifi ed’ (1997) 26 ILJ 74, 77 (emphasis in original).
48  F Smith and L Woods, ‘Causation in Francovich: The Neglected Problem’ 1997) 46 ICLQ 
925, 928 (citing Brasserie/Factortame para 79).
49  Ibid; see also Van Gerven (n 23) 523-24.
50  Smith and Woods (n 48) 928.
51  Van Gerven (n 34) 40.  
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It is obvious that, in an entity with such a diversity of rich legal tradi-
tions and languages that Europe is, it is exceedingly challenging to write 
complex texts in such a manner as to ensure even a similar perception 
and understanding by all its peoples (not to mention the potential issues 
that arise with translation, which only amplify the problem52). So much 
has already been conceded by the Court.53 Commentators have observed 
three main groups of legal traditions in Europe: English, French, and 
German, cleverly dubbed judges, legislators, and professors.54 Specifi -
cally relating to court opinions, English judgments refl ect the language of 
a judge sitting on the bench, the French versions are curt and authorita-
tive, resembling legislative language, while the German ones purport to 
reach their conclusions only after a high-level academic debate on the is-
sue.55 These three approaches to law refl ect deep differences in legal sys-
tems, represented by case-oriented English common law, rule-oriented 
French civil law, and concept-oriented German civil law, which are very 
much alive today in Europe and which obviously play an important role 
in the game of the articulation and understanding of legal rules, whether 
legislative or judge-made.56 One might contend that the existence of such 
diversity in legal mentality and tradition validates the often ambiguous 
language of the Court of Justice and Community legislation. Indeed, it 
is not diffi cult to argue that such diversity in approaches invites a cer-
tain level of generality in expression so that a common understanding 
can be achieved over time. This proposition has merit and is well taken 
here. Nevertheless, the vagueness necessarily present in any language 
that aims to be wide-ranging raises a host of issues and, in the present 
context, calls for a balancing of the merits and the drawbacks of the cur-
rent degree of extension of Francovich liability.  
Given the existence of potential problems of interpretation arising 
from the ambiguity of language, several questions emerge. First, it clearly 
seems equally likely that the ambiguity will cause as many mistakes to 
be committed by the Community institutions as by the national ones. In 
theory, this should not be problematic since Article 288 unequivocally 
establishes the principle of liability of Community institutions,57 which is 
confi rmed in Brasserie/Factortame in equally explicit terms, adding that, 
in similar circumstances and in absence of a particular justifi cation, the 
52  Wattel (n 41) 178-79.
53  See, eg, Brasserie/Factortame (n 22) para 76 (’the concept of fault does not have the 
same content in the various legal systems’).
54  RC Van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal His-
tory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987).
55  Van Gerven (n 34) 41.
56  Ibid.
57  Art 288 (n 33).
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liability of states is equal to the liability of the Community.58 Applying this 
principle practically in the context of Köbler liability yields the conclusion 
that liability attaches to the Community for the judgments of the Court of 
Justice that manifestly violate Community law; for example, overstepping 
competence limitations.59 At least one author maintains that manifest 
errors by the Court are not rare,60 but there is not yet a mechanism avail-
able for a review of the Court’s decisions. Applying Köbler, then, manifest 
errors in judgment by the Court of Justice should impose liability on the 
Community, and the failure of European legislature to create a mech-
anism for reviewing the Court’s decisions for manifest infringements 
should give rise to Brasserie-like liability for legislative omission.  
Be that as it may, no justifi cation has been offered for what seems 
to be the inconsistent practice of the Court of holding the Member States 
liable, but not holding the Community institutions equally liable. The 
harshness of the inconsistency is underscored by the fact that, unlike the 
liability of states - which is absent from any legislative text - the liability 
of the Community is supported by the plain words of Article 288.    
It follows that subjecting Member States or the Community to liabil-
ity for good faith mistakes of their judicial or legislative institutions, es-
pecially considering the issue of ambiguity of language and the resultant 
unclear guidance, is unwise and unjustifi ed because it lacks democratic 
legitimacy. The damages paid by the Member States in such cases are, of 
course, always ultimately paid by the citizens’ taxes.61 This fact might not 
be obvious to many taxpayers, as the economic strain from this liability 
on an average citizen is negligibly small. Of course, as practically conven-
ient a strategy as the spreading of loss might be, it can never alone be a 
principled justifi cation for the imposition of liability on Member States. 
Citizens of all Member States routinely express their political will regard-
ing the economic consequences of the acts of their governments, irre-
spective of how small these consequences might be.
Ambiguity of language necessarily creates ineffi ciencies (which are 
only aggravated by the Court’s reluctance to overturn its prior judg-
ments). This is acutely obvious in the case of Köbler liability, the legacy 
of which is likely to create more preliminary referrals and more costly 
procedure.62 These ineffi ciencies are, likewise, paid by the taxpayers who 
58  Brasserie/Factortame (n 22) para 42.
59  Wattel (n 41) 184.
60  Ibid (citing the Schumacker, Gilly, Gschwind, De Groot cases as examples where the 
Court ‘manifestly infringed the free movement of workers and the limitations of its compe-
tence’).
61  Ibid 186.
62  Ibid 181.
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never authorised the Court’s expansive mode.63 But more importantly, to 
the extent that one of the obvious purposes of the imposition of liability is 
compliance by national institutions with Community law - as evidenced 
by the Brasserie/Factortame and Köbler decisions64 - the effort is futile for 
at least two reasons. First, a trained and competent public servant can do 
nothing more than perform his or her job in good faith. To the extent that 
some mistakes are made in this process, it is not clear how a punishment 
can improve it and bring about a more ‘correct’ interpretation of Commu-
nity law. Second, at least if the equal ability of these government employ-
ees is presumed, then, statistically, a well-meaning employee (whether it 
be a legislator or a judge) will make as many good-faith mistakes as any 
other. In the context of Köbler liability, national judges will statistically 
err by the same percentage as the judges of the Court of Justice (to be 
sure, the Court of Justice has the fi nal say on the interpretation of Com-
munity Law, but it is impossible for the national courts to know such 
interpretation a priori). Thus, from the point of view of deterring mistakes 
by the institutions (or rectifying the institutions), the imposition of fi nan-
cial penalties would not seem to do the job.  
In summary, a balancing of the merits and the drawbacks of the 
Court of Justice’s expansion of Francovich liability draws the conclusion 
that, in light of the serious and complex concerns that arise as a conse-
quence of the ambiguous language of Community institutions, including 
both the legislature and the Court itself, the Court’s unrestrained judicial 
philosophy of imposing liability for damages on well-meaning states is 
unwarranted.    
V.  Seriousness of Breach
One might take some comfort in the fact that there is a check on 
the Court’s discretion in expanding Francovich liability: the requirement 
of a suffi ciently serious breach of Community law must be fulfi lled in 
order for liability to be incurred. The principle originates in the famous 
Schöppenstedt decision that states that individuals can obtain damages 
for Community legislative action of a general nature only if there is a 
suffi ciently serious breach of a superior rule of law.65 In later decisions, 
most notably in Brasserie/Factortame, the Schöppenstedt principle has 
been restricted to mean that the Court need not assess the seriousness 
63  Ibid 186.
64  Imposing state liability for breaches of the Community law by the legislature and judi-
ciary, respectively, of a relevant Member State.
65  Case 5/71 Zuckerfabrick Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975; see also C Hilson, 
‘Liability of Member States in Damages: The Place of Discretion’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 941; see W 
Van Gerven, The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford 2005) 113.
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of the breach if the Member State in question had narrow discretion in 
its actions.66 An extension of this principle implies a sliding scale where, 
the wider the discretion the states have over the implementation of the 
Community law, the more serious the breach must be for there to be li-
ability. In Dillenkofer, however, the Court restricted this principle further, 
holding that a failure by a state to implement a directive within the time 
period given to it by the Community is per se a suffi ciently serious breach 
of Community law.67 In Köbler, the Court set out some criteria for deter-
mining whether a breach was suffi ciently serious,68 and asserted that a 
‘manifest breach’ of Community law will always be suffi ciently serious. In 
Traghetti, the Court just extended the Köbler principle to apply to inad-
vertent mistakes as well. 
Discussing the issue of the seriousness of breach in great depth is 
beyond the scope of this article. Still, two observations are relevant. First, 
several authors have convincingly argued that the case law of the Court 
of Justice that attempts to clarify how the serious breach test fi ts in with 
the existing Francovich conditions has produced much confusion, due to 
the Court’s unpredictable treatment of the concept.69 The second point is 
that, in light of this unpredictable treatment, Member States have a very 
practical, if futile, choice. They can choose to act and therefore attempt 
to predict the Court’s approach to the serious breach test. In that case, 
they will likely err on the side of caution and lean towards interpreting 
any potential infringement as suffi ciently serious for Francovich liability 
to apply. This is undesirable because it is done for fear of sanctions and 
not out of a sense of democratic obligation to interpret laws faithfully, as 
well as because it causes overly cautious behaviour by the states. Mem-
ber States can also choose to refer more questions under Article 234, and 
let the Court make the decision, which is plainly burdensome from the 
standpoint of judicial economy.  
Further, while the seriousness of the breach test is seemingly a 
guardian of the powers of Member States in the Court’s post-Francovich 
jurisprudence, sound arguments have been advanced that it has been 
applied inconsistently and that it is doctrinally non-refi ned.70 A Euro-
sceptic might hence say that such circumstances render it merely a 
placeholder for any, however unprincipled, arguments the Court might 
choose to use in support of the substantive outcomes it wishes to reach. 
66  Brasserie/Factortame (n 22) para 25.
67  Dillenkofer (n 28).  Note that this is at least the prevalent interpretation of the judgment 
in Dillenkofer.  I pointed above that there might be other interpretations.
68  According to some commentators, the Court had misapplied its own criteria in the very 
Köbler case.  See, eg, Komarek (n 44) 85.
69  See Hilson (n 65) 942.
70  Ibid.
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But even a more neutral observer is likely to admit that the consequences 
of such a treatment are undesirable because they undermine the institu-
tional structure of the European Union and infl ict unnecessary and high 
costs on all parties concerned.  
The claim advanced in Part IV of this article - that due to ambiguous 
language and translation problems liability can arise even for the good 
faith mistakes of national institutions - might appear undercut by the 
requirement of the suffi ciently serious breach.  In other words, one could 
contend that the Court would be hard pressed to fi nd a suffi ciently serious 
breach that warrants liability in cases where a Member State or its insti-
tution makes a good faith mistake in interpretation of a directive. But the 
protection intended to be afforded by the requirement of the seriousness 
of breach does not address the scenario of vastly varying interpretations 
of Community law provisions. Unless one believes that (notwithstanding 
divergent approaches to interpretation in Member States as well as trans-
lation issues - all of which have a potential to spread a shroud of fog over 
the ‘correct’ meaning of a directive) good faith attempts to interpretation 
by the courts of Member States must somehow be close to that of the 
Court of Justice,71 it should be admitted that the suffi ciency of the breach 
requirement does little, if anything, to protect benevolent Member States 
from committing an offence that could result in liability.72
VI. Some Additional Observations  
Despite the trend engineered by the Court of Justice toward expand-
ing powers of the Community through what might be viewed as unwar-
ranted judicial activism, one could powerfully argue that, in spite of the 
absence of express legislation, Member States are in assent with the 
Court’s rulings, since they respect its judgments. This is exemplifi ed by 
71  This author is unaware of any such arguments having been made in the legal litera-
ture.
72  Admittedly, there are cases in which the Court of Justice appears to have characterised 
the breach by a Member State as not suffi ciently serious in order to avoid imposing state 
liability if  that Member State has done something in the general direction of implementing 
the relevant Directive.  See Case C-319/96 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v Skatteminis-
teriet [1998] ECR I-05225.  This author is unconvinced that occasional examples of such an 
application of the suffi ciently serious breach requirement change the position advanced in 
this article. Although the Court’s approach in Brinkmann could be viewed as generally le-
nient, the Court never stated that good faith mistakes (even if the Court itself, by the nature 
of things, has the right to such categorisation) by state institutions are less likely than the 
bad-faith ones to produce breaches that are suffi ciently serious for the purposes of the im-
position of liability on states. Furthermore, the Brinkmann case did not deal with a mistake 
in interpretation but, rather, with the inability of implementing a directive; hence, it should 
be seen as an indication of the Court’s tendency to forgive the non-implementation of a di-
rective to those States that have taken at least some steps towards it, rather than a sign of 
lenience towards the States that have simply misunderstood one (even in good faith).  
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Germany’s and France’s acceptance of the Court’s earlier decisions and 
by the UK’s deference more recently in (an earlier) Factortame case, where 
Lord Bridge rejected public calls warning that the Court’s decision violat-
ed a long-standing British tradition of unrestrained power of Parliament, 
and asserted the supremacy  of Community law.73 National legislatures, 
likewise, have done nothing to counter the Court of Justice’s judgments. 
To be sure, there have been cases in the past where the Member State 
governments have deemed the Court’s decisions unacceptable and react-
ed by amending the Treaty.74 The unwillingness of Member States to react 
similarly to the post-Francovich sequence of cases might then be under-
stood to refl ect the agreement of states with the decisions, which would 
provide some relief to the worrisome appearance of the lack of democratic 
legitimacy. In the same vein, there are provisions in the Treaty which 
expressly prohibit the Community legislature from harmonising national 
laws in certain areas.75 Some of these areas are: education, vocational 
training, culture, and public health.76 Obviously, one can argue that if 
Member States wanted to retain certain competencies, not only could 
they do this by amending the Treaty, but they could have done so when 
they ratifi ed it, as they did with these areas.  
Despite the foregoing, however, the suggestion is questionable that 
the Member States have approved of the Court’s post-Francovich juris-
prudence by their legislative inaction and executive compliance. First, 
the course taken by the Court of Justice was not obvious at the time 
when the Treaty was signed. If no textual support exists in the legisla-
tive texts for the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence on this issue, it is 
diffi cult to imagine how the Member States could have prevented the 
current judicial treatment by drafting some of the provisions differently. 
Second, amending the Treaty has become increasingly diffi cult, in light 
of the accession of new Member States into the Union (mirroring in this 
sense the diffi culties in amending the US Constitution). Any attempt to 
amend the treaty is likely to be subject to the possibly tense relations be-
tween the legislatures of the Member States and the Community, which 
would make it diffi cult to agree on any consequential amendments. Even 
in the case that the Treaty is successfully amended, the Court might 
not be immune to infl uences by certain powerful members. For example, 
73  See Lord Bridge’s opinion in Regina v Secretary of State ex parte Factortame Ltd [1991] 
1 All ER 70, 107-08 (HL).
74  See, eg, Case 262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange [1990] ECR I-1889.  After the 
decision, the governments added a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty that limited the scope 
of the Court’s judgment; see also Garrett (n 2) 166. 
75  Van Gerven (n 34) 60.
76  EC Treaty arts 149(4), 150(4), 151(4), and 152(4), respectively; see Van Gerven (n 34) 
60.
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one commentator suggested that the Court of Justice might be willing to 
tailor its approach toward state liability in ways desired by the core Mem-
ber governments, especially France and Germany.77 Hence, the argument 
that the assent of Member States to the Court’s judgments serves as a 
validation to the Court’s jurisprudence does not seem to be as strong as 
it might appear.  
VII. Conclusion
This article has ventured to show that the European Court of Jus-
tice’s sequence of decisions expanding state liability is coloured with a 
pro-integration agenda.  This is undesirable both because such an ap-
proach lacks democratic legitimacy and because it imposes serious costs 
on Member States. Lack of democratic legitimacy is refl ected in the ab-
sence of any textual support in the EC Treaty for the Court’s approach, 
as well as in the fact that especially the Court’s latest decisions do not 
satisfy the commonality requirement laid out in Article 288 of the Treaty. 
Equally importantly, the ambiguity in expression both by the Court and 
the European legislature continues to infl ict signifi cant costs on Member 
States, and the Court’s insistence on expanding the Community powers 
is magnifying these costs further. The requirement of suffi ciently serious 
breach, although protective of the states at fi rst glance, does little to al-
leviate these concerns. If the Court had its eye on a long-term picture of 
Europe as a balanced and sustainable constitutional entity, it would be 
well advised to take a more cautious and restrained role.  
77  Garrett (n 2) 173.
